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aBstraCt
This study explores the structural relationship of director networks among boards of 
directors in publicly listed companies in Malaysia using social network analysis (SNA) 
techniques at both the director and company levels.  This paper examines whether company 
corporate governance practices and institutional characteristics are associated with 
company network size and pattern. SNA performed using UCINET and NetDraw software 
shows that the directors and company in the networking are moderately connected. This 
suggests that there is a small group of directors or companies that are well-connected 
and well-positioned to exercise power, control, and influence over the network. This study 
also reveals the interconnectedness of board members and companies. The regression 
results also identify a group of the most well-connected and well-positioned directors 
and companies in Malaysia’s corporate governance environment. The results suggest that 
board size, board meeting, and duality are the corporate governance practices, which most 
influence company network size and pattern. The presence of a Bumiputera or politically-
connected director is an institutional characteristic, which especially determines the 
network of a company.  
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IntroduCtIon
Director networks can be categorised as either social or professional. Networks 
established through academic background, specific interests such as sports, music 
or hobbies, or club memberships are examples of social networks. Meanwhile, 
professional networks are established through daily professional work or business 
life. Prior studies have shown that the economics and finance literature has begun 
to pay more attention to the influence of director networks on corporate decision 
making and monitoring.  
In addition, social networks have been used in numerous studies of 
kinship structure, social mobility, science citations, contact among members of 
deviant groups, corporate power, international trade exploitation, class structure 
and many other areas (Burt, 1998; Flores-Yeffal & Zhang, 2012; Hoitash, 
2010; Krishnan, Raman, Yang, & Yu, 2011; Scott, 1988). A study on corporate 
governance concerns for Petra-Perdana Berhad in 2010 is one example which 
demonstrates how director networks may impair company stakeholder interests if 
a necessary solution goes untaken (Bushon, 2010). 
Differing from prior studies, this study explores the structural relationship 
among board of director networks in Malaysia, at both the director and company 
level. Then, this study attempt to determine whether there is an association between 
company internal governance, institutional characteristics and director’s networks 
at company level. Commonly, the board of director composition in Malaysia 
publicly listed companies can be executive or nonexecutive, and independent 
or non-independent. However, the board must have majority of independent 
directors when the chairman of the board is not an independent director (Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance, 2012).  
related lIterature
Prior studies shown that poor management decisions will be attributed, in part, to 
inadequate oversight by directors. This will damage prospects in the labour market 
for directors and managers (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Thus, the selection 
for competence directors is essential for companies in order to succeed. From 
here, board of director networks would influence how the company select and 
appoint their board members. Due to the financial crisis, scholars were challenged 
to establish causal inferences that the endogeneity of board of director’s structure 
variables could determine various companies’ outcome variables which could 
be determined through, among others, the unobservable board of director’s 
characteristics (Dey & Liu, 2010). 
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Board of director networks is a vital aspect of board characteristics and 
call for further exploration. Companies with boards, which have strong social 
networks, tend to enhance company and shareholder value as well as individual 
director value (Horton, Millo, & Serafaim, 2012). It is understood that most of 
the time, directors choose not to perform studies or experiments, but prefer to 
rely on whatever information they have obtained through casual communication 
(Fracassi, 2012). A network between boards of directors from different companies 
may allow valuable information to flow through the network (Fracassi & Tate, 
2012). It also increases value for shareholders. The positive aspects of board 
of director networks could also increase the sharing of market information best 
practices and information negotiation, while extending professional contacts 
(Larcker & Tayan, 2010). 
Prior studies also have shown that board of director networks play a 
major role to provide an important source of information (Horton et al., 2012; 
Chenhall, Hall & Smith, 2010; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Eventually, this 
will support the company’s strategic decisions and control direction (Durbach 
& Parker, 2009) and enhance the board’s advising role (Stuart & Yim, 2010). In 
addition, effective networks also will lead to company efficacy. Board of director 
networks could be a medium for directors to learn the appropriate strategies 
for their companies through the sharing of experiences and knowledge from 
other companies (Horton et al., 2012; Chenhall et al., 2010; Durbach & Parker, 
2009; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Furthermore, the information flows within 
the network are valuable information, as it is first-hand, up-to-date and timely 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). This information will increase board effectiveness 
(Stuart & Yim, 2010).  
As current business situations often involve a large fraction of board 
of directors on multiple boards (Stuart & Yim, 2010), this will influence the 
positioning of directors within the networks, as different boards will look into 
different networks (Horton et al., 2012). The selection of an appropriate director 
will provide indirect as well as direct strategic information or access to strategic 
resources (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). The quality, costs, relevance and 
timeliness of information will be positively affected thus enhance the company’s 
value (Horton et al., 2012). 
Prior research and current practices show that the allocation of linked 
board of directors across companies is not random (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). 
Furthermore, the central part of corporate governance is the board of directors, 
specifically their networks (Pesämaa, Klaesson, & Haahti, 2011). Firms with 
powerful executive are likely to appoint more linked directors for reasons that 
are more pleasant and friendly from the perspective of shareholders. Horton et al. 
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(2012), shows that different board of directors will definitely will looking into 
different network positions due to the level of compensation offered. In addition, 
Kim and Lu (2011) found that CEOs might prefer someone with whom they are 
socially connected in order to strengthen the CEO connectedness. 
Furthermore, there is a need to capture all possible avenues through 
which a director can obtain an information advantage, such as golf club 
memberships, religious activities, and political affiliations (Horton et al., 2012). 
Social networks consist of partially overlapping markets; therefore, no single 
board of directors is fully aware of the entire network (Horton et al., 2012). 
Having a strong social network for a local setting, in this study Malaysia, can 
be beneficial force for local companies (Pesämaa et al., 2011). Fracassi and Tate 
(2012) also found that the networks between team of management from different 
companies would increase shareholder value through the creation of conduits, 
which enable valuable information flows from one firm to another.  
social network theory 
The social network approach originates from three schools of thought: sociology, 
anthropology and role theory (Tichy, Tushman, & Fombrun, 1979). From a 
sociology perspective, the approach emphasizes patterns of interaction and 
communications as the key to understanding social life (Simmel, 1971). As for 
anthropology, the integration of the Strauss, Malinowski and Frazer theories 
emphasizes the content of the relationships joining individuals, the conditions 
under which they would exits, and eventually the evolution of these bonds over 
time (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1993). Finally, role theory refines the definition 
of organisation by Katz and Kahn in 1966 as a ‘fish nets’ of interrelated offices 
(Tichy et al., 1979). Thus implies the network concept but is limited to one-degree 
role sets, in which is an individual directly linked to a focal person. It also limited 
because of individual bias (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
A social network is defined as any bounded set of connected social 
units (Streeter & Gillespie, 1993). This definition highlights three important 
characteristics of social networks. First, networks have boundaries. The second 
key element of the definition is "connectedness" in social networks. The third key 
aspect of this definition is the social unit. Scott (1988) describes a social network 
as a strange but surprisingly powerful image of social reality. Every individual 
is connected to one another by invisible bonds, which are knitted together into 
a crisscross mesh of networks. These networks can be considered analogous to 
fishing nets or a length of cloth made from intertwined fabrics. In the Malaysian 
business context, a social network may be defined as inter-company coordination 
that is characterised by organic of social systems (Abd. Hamid, 2011). 
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Social network theory suggests that the patterns and implications of 
relationships demonstrate specific behavioural principles and properties where 
the network theories require specification in terms of patterns of relations, 
characterising a group or social system as a whole (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 
1993). The use of social network theory as a premise for predicting network 
behaviour, then, is expectedly lower than the application of such a methodology 
to analyse network structure and operations. To date, two prominent network 
properties have provided a framework for viewing network behaviour, and these 
properties provide the basis for articles invoking the use of social network theory 
(Schultz-Jones, 2009). Scott (1988) further simplified the social network concept 
as a set of points connected by lines. From this idea emerged the application 
of social network analysis to the mathematical theory of graphs, in the hope of 
discovering a formal model for the representation of network structure. 
Nevertheless, the outcomes of a social network can be both positive and 
negative. The positive outcome consists of broad access to power, information and 
solidarity, which eventually lead to the achievement of companies’ desired goals. 
However, negative outcomes include costliness, inward focus, as well as rivalry 
against one network to another (Chenhall et al., 2010). In addition, companies 
with strong group memberships as well as broad social network are likely to 
maintain their core cultural values and attracts others in assisting the operation 
processes (Chenhall et al., 2010). Furthermore, resources and advantages can be 
acquired only through individual networks and networks between individuals, 
rather than firm-level networks (Smith, 2009).
data and MethodoloGy
sample and data
The data on director’s profiles was obtained from annual reports downloaded 
from Bursa Malaysia Berhad official website (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 2012). 
The sample consists of boards of directors for publicly listed companies in 2011. 
Table 1 describe the samples.
Table 1 and Table 2 summarise the demographic profile of the sample. 
The final sample observed was 745 publicly listed companies. Companies 
categorised under industrial product and trading and services sector contribute 
more than 50% from the total sample. It is important to mention that companies 
listed under financial sector were excluded because it has a very rigid set of rules 
and regulations.  
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Table 1
Derivation of sample
Total
Number of companies listed as at 31st December 2011 822
Less: 
Company listed under Financial Sector 
36
Company with PN17 status 16
Companies with incomplete data (unavailable 2011 annual report) 23
Outliers 2
Final Sample 745
Table 2
Industries classifications
Sector No. %
Constructions 40 5.37
Consumer products 125 16.78
Hotel 4 0.54
Industrial products 237 31.81
Infrastructure 6 0.81
Mining 1 0.13
Plantations 41 5.50
Properties 90 12.08
Technology 27 3.62
Trading & Services 174 23.22
Total 745 100.00
The information provided in annual reports includes the name of directors, 
age, types of directorships, citizenship, academic and industrial background and 
professional affiliations. In some cases, the annual report also includes biographical 
information of directors, such as family members who are also board members 
in the same company. Shared directorates may form an undirected boardroom 
network. Shared directorates is defined as two companies are linked if they shared 
at least one director as board member, vice versa (Larcker, So & Wang, 2013).
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director network
The study focuses on social network analysis at both director and company 
level. The analysis used UCINET version 6.532, a social network analysis tool 
developed by Borgatti, Everett and Freeman (2002). To examine the relationship 
between internal governance, institutional characteristics and director’s networks, 
this study employs the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model:
NETWORK = b0 + b1BSIZEi + b2BMEETi + b3DUALITYi,+ b4BINDi  
+ b6ACINDi  + b6INSTINVi + b7AUDQi + b8ETHNICITYi 
+ b9POLCONi + b10FAMFIRMSi + b11FIRMSIZEi  
+ b12LEVERAGEi + b13INDUSTRIESi  + µi
(1)
where NETWORK is the director networks, BSIZE is the total number of directors 
on the board of the companies, BMEET is the total board meeting in a financial 
year. DUALITY take value of 1 if the firm has duality role of CEO and chairman 
and zero otherwise, BIND takes a value of 1 if proportion of independent directors 
on board is more than two-thirds, ACIND takes a value of 1 if all the audit 
committee members are independent, INSTINV is the percentage of shareholdings 
owned by top five largest institutional investor to the total number of shares 
issued, AUDQ take value of 1 if the firm is audited by Big 4 auditors and zero 
otherwise, ETHNICITY is the proportion of Bumiputera directors on the board 
to the total number of directors of the companies, POLCON takes a value of 1 
if the firm is politically connected and zero otherwise, FAMFIRMS takes a value 
of 1 if the company is family-owned, FIRMSIZE is the natural log of total assets 
representing firm size, LEVERAGE is the total debt deflated by total equity. 
The five network measures (DEGREE-I, DEGREE-E, EIGEN, 
BETWEENNESS and CLOSENESS) are discussed in the next section and 
regressed separately in the model. As for independent variables, this study employs 
common corporate governance variables used in prior studies (Al-dhamari & 
Ismail, 2013; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Mohamad Nor, Shafie, & Wan Hussin, 2010). 
social network analysis
This section discusses the analysis employed in this study consists of a description 
of the Social Network Analysis (SNA) as well as company’s corporate governance 
and institutional characteristics. Then, the correlation of all tested variables and 
the regressions for all network measures including DEGREE-IN, DEGREE-EX, 
EIGEN, BETWEENNESS and CLOSENESS are examined.
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The SNA for this study is focused on current formal social network 
among directors. The SNA measurements were carried out using UCINET and 
NetDraw software packages developed by Borgatti et al. (2002). The network 
measurement computed by UCINET and the visualised by NetDraw. Table 3 
shows the descriptive statistics for multiple centrality measurements at firm’s 
level.  
For instance, Tan Sri Datuk Asmat Bin Kamaludin has possible 
connections to other 81 directors in the sample where he secured through 10 
company directorships. Hence, the number of directorships for this director could 
be interpreted as an indicator of director’s credentials. He also is well-positioned in 
the entire network based on betweenness centrality value. He has position himself 
at possible 656325.125 paths to other director’s connections. It is suggested that 
he is the director with the most access to another boardroom. He has eigenvector 
centrality value of 0.1060, and is 8th ranked among the top 20 directors. His 
direct connections with other directors also makes him well-connected to other 
directors. These indirect connections reflect the power and prestige he has gained 
throughout his tenure.
In order to visualise the network pattern for both at directors and 
companies level, network visualisation software NetDraw version 2.141 is 
used. The software is included in the UCINET software package. The software 
visualises a network using a spring-embedded application. This is to visualise 
the directors and companies connected by lines drawn closely together whereas 
unconnected directors or companies are pushed apart. The application treats 
network lines as springs with a particular elasticity and strength. The result is a 
graphical representation of the linkages between directors, as shown in Figure 1. 
In Figure 1, the square shapes represent directors and lines represent 
connections between directors. The bigger the square shape is, the larger the 
connections the director has. The figure also shows that in the Malaysian stock 
market, the directors have created a network pattern of social relationships 
through directors’ interlocks. The network pattern shows that relatively there are 
concentrations in the director’s social networks. The level of concentration of 
director interlocks has severe consequences for maintaining the independence, 
transparency and accountability of corporate governance affairs to shareholders 
(Aviña-Vázquez & Uddin, 2013; Fracassi & Tate, 2012). Directors with a greater 
value of degree of centrality are considered as well-connected and positioned 
at the central of the network. The remaining directors will then be pushed apart 
from the network central accordingly based on the individual director’s degree 
centrality value.
Corporate Governance, Institutional Characteristics and Directors Network
143
Figure 1. Network structure of board of directors for Malaysian publicly listed companies 
in 2011
results
It is important to note that the network structure at the company level showed 97 
isolated companies. Isolated companies are those without any connections with 
the rest of the sample, as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, closeness centrality can 
only be used after whole network excludes isolated companies. Table 3 shows a 
description of all five network centrality measures. 
descriptive statistics
At company level, the degree, which included all connection within and outside 
company, documented Network Centralisation Index (NCI) at 0.26%. This 
indicate the existence of small number of dominant personality in the network. 
The dominant individual director acquired 47 direct connections from multiple 
directorship appointments. The degree of external companies was documented 
NCI at 0.37%. A total of 283 companies (37.53%) have degree centrality valued 
above average. The remaining sample if 471 companies (62.47%) are valued 
below average. The highest degree centrality is 32 and the lowest is 0. The isolated 
97 companies are valued at 0-degree centrality. 
However, the eigenvector centrality values show relatively different 
results compared to degree centrality at the company level. The NCI is 78.20%. 
A total of 24 (3.22%) companies valued above average. The remaining sample 
721 (96.68%) contributed to the majority companies valued below average. This 
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shows that not all well-connected companies have direct connections to otherwise 
unconnected companies. This also indicates the presence of an elite group with 
well connection with other well-connected companies. The network centralisation 
for betweenness centrality at company level is 5.08%. A total of 252 (33.42%) 
showed betweenness centrality valued above average. The remaining 502 
companies (66.58%) valued below average. The maximum path from a company 
to other companies is 16125.363. 
Table 3
Univariate statistics multiple centrality measurements at the company level
  Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. NCI (%)
DEGREE-IN 12.117 4.000 47.000 5.680 0.26%
DEGREE-EX 5.404 1.000 32.000 4.817 0.37%
EIGEN 0.003 0.535 0.000 0.036 78.20%
BETWEENNESS 1124.751 0.000 15281.280 1819.042 5.08%
CLOSENESS 91.276 0.000 175.486 51.945 23.59%
In Figure 2, the networks structure shown is the network between 
companies. The company’s network derived from the network analysis 
results at director level. This network consists of direct lines between any two 
companies if the company shared at least one director in both company boards. 
The calculation and visualisation for social networks at company’s level is to 
examine the relational structure between companies. The square shape represents 
the individual company. As the number of direct connections between company 
increases, the large square shape. There are interconnections among companies in 
the Malaysian stock market for 2011. Worth mentioning that 92 companies have 
no direct connection with other companies in the network. 
The results also suggest that there are opportunities for directors with 
lesser boardroom appointment, provided that they are able to exploit their own 
connections. A director’s ability to fully utilise their own connection could 
improve his chances to be appointed at other company boardroom. The multiple 
directorships appointment could be seen as a proxy for director’s reputation. 
Director with multiple directorships can be seen to have certain advantages 
over other such as resource exchange, control and influence over company’s 
management (Renneboog & Zhao, 2011). Therefore, companies tend to appoint 
directors who are well-connected to other boardrooms (Barnea & Guedj, 2007). 
Appointment of well-connected directors’ gives positive significant effects to 
company level of connectedness. It is suggested that the high degree centrality 
value for directors will contribute to high degree centrality of the company where 
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the directors appointed. A well-connected company will have greater access to 
information and communication channels.
Figure 2. Network structure of Malaysian publicly listed companies in 2011
Table 4 describes the descriptive statistics of all variables in the model. 
Panel A shows all five network centrality measures namely DEGREE-IN, 
DEGREE-EX, EIGEN, BETWEENNESS and CLOSENESS. The ‘n’ indicate the 
normalised value of each network centrality. The normalised value will be using 
when comparing more than one set of networks for the same network centrality 
measures. In average, the DEGREE-IN shows that each company has 12 direct 
connections within and with external companies, ranging is between 11 and 47. 
The finding indicate that on average a company connected with other boards at 
12, which includes the company itself, and with other companies. DEGREE-
EX averages 4.69, which denotes the number of direct connections of the board 
outside the firm.
Panel B of Table 4 tabulates the descriptive statistics for the corporate 
governance variables. The average board has 7 directors, with a range of 3 to 
18 directors. The average board meeting a company held is 5, with a range of 5 
to 17. Only 27.7% of the sample companies combine the functions of CEO and 
chairperson (DUALITY), while 5.5% have boards that consist of more than two-
thirds independent directors (BIND). About 62.4% of sample companies have 
an audit committee that consists entirely of independent directors. Institutional 
investors (INSTINV) average 2.89%, while just over half of sample companies 
are audited by a Big 4 accounting firm (BIG4).
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Panel C tabulates the descriptive for remaining variables of this study. 
Bumiputera directors (ETHNICITY) make up on average 32.8% of the boards, 
whilst 50.2% of the sample companies are politically connected (Johnson & 
Mitton, 2003). About one-fifth of the sample are family companies (FAMFIRMS). 
The natural log of total assets (FIRMSIZE) averages 19.84, whilst the average 
ratio of debt to total equity (LEVEGRAGE) is 0.485. These figures are presented 
in Panel D of Table 4. 
The correlations between the different network centrality measures are 
all above 0.50 and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that each network 
centrality measurement should not use in the same regression equation. The 
Spearman correlations between NDEGREE-IN and BIND are −0.065 at 1% level. 
The results are statistically significant but show a higher negative correlation for 
Pearson correlation. This is contrary to the expectation of the study that BIND 
decreases network centrality. FAMFIRMS, FIRMSIZE and LEVERAGE are 
significant at the 1% level with all network centrality measures for Spearman 
correlation. This is not surprising, since such companies tend to be managed by 
family members, and are well established with large company size. ETHNICITY 
and POLCON are also significantly positive with almost all network centrality 
measures. This suggests that firms with more Bumiputera or politically connected 
directors bring along their connections from other companies.  
DEGREE-IN is a company’s total internal and external direct links. 
DEGREE-EX is the total external direct links. EIGEN is the number of companies 
adjacent to a given company weighted by its degree centrality. BETWEENNESS 
is the proportion of all geodesic path from a firm to other pass through another 
firm. CLOSENESS is the sum of geodesic/shortest distances from a firm to 
all other companies. The normalised value for each network measurements 
is denoted by ‘n’. BSIZE is the total number of directors on the board of the 
companies. BMEET is the total board meeting in a financial year. DUALITY take 
value of 1 if the firm has duality role of CEO and chairman and zero otherwise. 
BIND takes a value of 1 if proportion of independent directors on board is more 
than two-thirds. ACIND takes a value of 1 if all the audit committee members 
are independent. INSTINV is the percentage of shareholdings owned by top five 
largest institutional investor to the total number of shares issued. AUDQ take 
value of 1 if the firm is audited by Big 4 auditors and zero otherwise. ETHNICITY 
is the proportion of Bumiputera directors on the board to the total number of 
directors of the companies. POLCON takes a value of 1 if the firm is politically 
connected and zero otherwise. FAMFIRMS takes a value of 1 if the company is 
family-owned. FIRMSIZE is the natural log of total assets representing firm size. 
LEVERAGE is the total debt deflated by total equity.
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics (N = 745) 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
Panel A: Network Centrality
DEGREE-IN 12.117 11.000 47.000 4.000 5.680
DEGREE-EX 4.697 3.000 32.000 0.000 4.792
EIGEN 0.003 0.000 0.535 0.000 0.036
BETWEENNESS 1124.751 313.687 15281.280 0.000 1819.042
CLOSENESS 91.276 106.918 175.486 0.000 51.945
NDEGREE-IN 0.090 0.082 0.350 0.030 0.042
NDEGREE-EX 0.063 0.040 0.429 0.000 0.064
NEIGEN 0.483 0.000 75.718 0.000 5.162
NBETWEENNESS 0.405 0.113 5.499 0.000 0.655
NCLOSENESS 12.235 14.332 23.524 0.000 6.963
Panel B: Corporate Governance Variables
BSIZE 7.416 7.000 18.000 3.000 1.935
BMEET 5.337 5.000 17.000 1.000 1.785
DUALITY 0.277 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.448
BIND 0.055 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.228
ACIND 0.624 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.485
INSTINV 2.899 0.000 72.630 0.000 7.081
AUDQ 0.544 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.498
Panel C: Institutional Variables 
ETHNICITY 0.328 0.250 1.000 0.000 0.265
POLCON 0.502 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.500
FAMFIRMS 0.213 0.222 0.714 0.000 0.215
Panel D: Control Variables
FIRMSIZE 19.841 19.648 25.036 16.811 1.415
LEVERAGE 0.485 0.280 9.415 0.000 0.765
Multivariate analysis
It is possible that the results demonstrate that a company may recognise the 
elite status of a newly appointed well-connected director into the company 
(Subrahmanyam, 2008). A well-connected director is appointed to allow the 
sharing of critical resources and information access from his connections (Johnson, 
Schnatterly, Bolton, & Tuggle, 2011). Table 5 presents the main regression of this 
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study based on a sample of 745 companies in 2011. The dependent variables 
from columns 1 to 5 include the network centrality measures, namely DEGREE-
IN, DEGREE-EX, EIGEN, BETWEENNESS and CLOSENESS, respectively. The 
results found positive and significant association between board size and network 
centrality measures except for CLOSENESS. It is most likely that the additional 
appointment of new directors in a company establishes connections to the new 
company boardroom, hence increasing the direct connections of the company. 
This study also found a significant negative association between board 
meeting and company direct connections. The increased number of board 
meetings may decrease the number of direct connections acquired from well-
connected directors. Prior studies have documented that frequent board meetings 
are an indicator of board member response to poor company performance 
(Brick & Chidambaran, 2010; Vafeas, 1999). Thus, the results suggest that well-
connected directors most likely to avoid being associated with company with 
poor performance. Being appointed as the director of poor performance company 
would damage a well-connected director. 
As for duality, it is only significantly and negatively associated with 
closeness. Regardless the uncommon practices of duality in Malaysia publicly 
listed companies (Abdullah, 2004), the presence of duality in a company would 
decrease the ability the company to be closer to other companies. It is possibly 
due to the practice of duality commonly close related to companies managed 
by family members (Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 2009). Consistent results are also 
shown for FAMFIRMS, which is significantly negatively associated with indirect 
network centrality measures, BETWEENNESS and CLOSENESS, respectively. 
Further enhancing the understanding on influence of Bumiputera as 
well as politically-connected directors, this study found that both factors were 
significantly positively associated with all network centrality measurements, 
except in model 3. Consistent with prior studies, the presence of Bumiputera or 
politically-connected directors in a company in Malaysia has been one of the 
major elements since the establishment of the Malaysian capital market (Fung, 
Gul, & Radhakrishnan, 2015; Yatim, Kent, & Clarkson, 2006; Yunos, Ismail, & 
Smith, 2012).  The presence of Bumiputera or politically-connected directors 
would increase both a company’s direct and indirect connections. The embedded 
perception that Bumiputera or politically-connected directors are rich with critical 
resources and information access draws the attention of a company to appoint 
such directors for easy access to those critical resources (Fung et al., 2015; Smith, 
Halgin, Kidwell-Lopez, Labianca, Brass, & Borgatti, 2014). 
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Table 5
Main regression (N = 745) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
C −0.113 −0.203 −9.210 −1.860 −5.865
 −5.461*** −5.427*** −1.609** −4.614*** −2.197***
BSIZE 0.011 0.006 0.306 0.031 0.017
 12.266*** 3.832*** 1.484* 2.320*** 0.135
BMEET −0.003 −0.005 −0.053 0.017 −0.083
 −3.812*** −3.797*** −1.047 1.121 −0.816
DUALITY −0.002 −0.005 0.063 −0.052 −0.885
 −0.970 −1.030 0.149 −1.094 −1.784**
BIND 0.005 0.008 0.611 0.009 0.033
 0.970 0.939 1.174 0.085 0.030
ACIND −0.001 −0.001 0.402 0.055 0.211
 −0.322 −0.326 1.849** 1.254 0.486
INSTINV 0.000 0.000 −0.017 0.006 0.014
 0.720 0.714 −1.264* 1.659** 0.612
AUDQ 0.002 0.004 −0.377 −0.038 −0.260
 0.882 0.866 −0.970 −0.862 −0.635
ETHNICITY 0.020 0.035 0.055 0.290 1.863
 3.984*** 3.992*** 0.216 2.692*** 1.870**
POLCON 0.012 0.021 0.401 0.118 1.542
 4.826*** 4.847*** 1.914** 2.627*** 3.445***
FAMFIRMS −0.005 −0.010 2.312 −0.206 −1.721
 −0.931 −0.943 1.753** −1.746** −1.700**
FIRMSIZE 0.006 0.011 0.342 0.090 0.956
 6.341*** 6.307*** 1.413* 4.370*** 6.217***
LEVERAGE 0.003 0.005 0.181 0.087 0.459
2.244*** 2.208*** 0.705 2.388*** 2.820***
Industry Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.274 0.313 0.169 0.158
F-statistic 44.637*** 18.564*** 22.183*** 10.451*** 8.656***
N 745 745 745 745 653
No. of Directors 4416 4416 4416 4416 3804
DEGREE-IN (1) is a company’s total internal and external direct links. DEGREE-EX (2) is the total external 
direct links. EIGEN (3) is the number of companies adjacent to a given company weighted by its degree centrality. 
BETWEENNESS (4) is the proportion of all geodesic path from a firm to other pass through another firm. 
CLOSENESS (5) is the sum of geodesic/ shortest distances from a firm to all other companies. The normalised 
value for each network measurements is denoted by ‘n’. BSIZE is the total number of directors on the board of the 
companies. BMEET is the total board meeting in a financial year. DUALITY take value of 1 if the firm has duality 
role of CEO and chairman and zero otherwise. BIND takes a value of 1 if proportion of independent directors 
on board is more than two-thirds. ACIND takes a value of 1 if all the audit committee members are independent. 
INSTINV is the percentage of shareholdings owned by top five largest institutional investor to the total number of 
shares issued. AUDQ take value of 1 if the firm is audited by Big 4 auditors and zero otherwise. ETHNICITY is the 
proportion of Bumiputera directors on the board to the total number of directors of the companies. POLCON take 
value of 1 if the firm is politically connected and zero otherwise. FAMFIRMS takes a value of 1 if the company 
is family-owned. FIRMSIZE is the natural log of total assets represent firm size. LEVERAGE is the total debt 
deflated by total equity. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Additionally, Bumiputera are generally characterised as team players 
that uphold Islamic values and beliefs, thus manifesting their ability to enhance 
company performance (Jamaludin & Abdul Wahab, 2016; Yunos et al., 2012). 
Finally, this study has documented a significant positive association between firm 
size and all network centrality measures. The larger the size of company, the more 
likely that better-connected directors are appointed in the company boardroom. 
Similarly, an increase of the leverage of a company indicates a need to appoint 
more or better-connected directors. 
ConClusIon
From the full account of the publicly listed companies in Malaysia, this study 
provides insight into the complex network structure of directors and companies. 
Prior studies in social network analysis emphasized the significant influence of 
network structure based on the selected companies sampled. This study has also 
explored the significant differences between director networks and company 
networks. The results of analysis provide evidence that a relatively moderate 
number of directors and company in Malaysia has the opportunity to enjoy a 
certain amount of power and influence. Corporate governance practices may 
be associated with the connections a director has during director nomination. 
Additional tests are suggested to examine whether these group of directors and 
companies do in fact apply certain exercises.
In addition, the study has identified a relatively important attribute, in 
those directors or companies who are well-connected and well-positioned to exert 
power are generally noticeable to other in the same network. A director who has 
multiple directorships has social group in the same boardrooms, may be one of the 
possible justifications. Consequently, there is a chance that directors with multiple 
directorships also have multiple directorships in other boardrooms.  This study 
also provides reasonable justification relates to the restriction number directorship 
enforce for Malaysian publicly listed companies by Bursa Malaysia Berhad. For 
listing requirement, the maximum number of directorship for either publicly 
listed or private company have been imposed. The regulations emphasized the 
importance of directors to perform their duties and obligation for the interest of 
publicly listed company’s shareholders. The directors are believed to effectively 
fulfil their duties and obligations by providing better governance for the company. 
This study is subject to several limitations. First, it is limited to Malaysia 
publicly listed companies for a one-year period. While the sample encapsulates 
the majority of Malaysian large publicly listed companies, other large private 
companies were excluded. Second, the study did not explore the role that directors 
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are assigned, whether executive or non-executive, or related committee members 
within the companies, which also may influence the director connections. 
The SNA used in this study only considers one social connection, namely the 
director’s formal appointment as a board member. Further analyses of other forms 
of social connections such as co-membership in any social organisations, alumni 
or other professional bodies’ memberships are suggested. These forms of social 
connections also connect directors, even to unconnected directors from formal 
networks. Thus, for future research, it is essential to explore whether the exercise 
of power by the directors and companies in fact actually takes place. 
In addition, social networks in the form of informal relationships should 
be further explored, including the impact of the informal connections as part 
of a contribution to social network studies. Studies should also be conducted 
concerning private companies. The additional value of director networks could 
be captured by including private companies, as a director may hold directorships 
at both publicly listed and private companies. 
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